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Owen’s pre-evolutionary definition of a homolog as “the same organ in different animals
under every variety of form and function” and its redefinition after Darwin as “the same
trait in different lineages due to common ancestry” entail the same heuristic problem:
how to establish “sameness.” Although different criteria for homology often conflict,
there is currently a generalized acceptance of gene expression as the best criterion.
This gene-centered view of homology results from a reductionist and preformationist
concept of living beings. Here, we adopt an alternative organismic-epigenetic viewpoint,
and conceive living beings as systems whose identity is given by the dynamic interactions
between their components at their multiple levels of composition. We posit that there
cannot be an absolute homology criterion, and instead, homology should be inferred
from comparisons at the levels and developmental stages where the delimitation of the
compared trait lies. In this line, we argue that neural connectivity, i.e., the hodological
criterion, should prevail in the determination of homologies between brain supra-cellular
structures, such as the vertebrate pallium.
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Introduction: The Problem of Homology
The concept of homology has long been implicitly used by biologists, as comparison has been the
basis of our classification of the natural world at least since Aristotle (Russell, 1916; Nordenskiold,
1928). Nevertheless, the study of structural correspondence moved to the foreground (Russell,
1916; Coleman, 1971) in the first half of the nineteenth century, when biology emerged as an
independent science and morphology became its core discipline. By comparing the structure
of living beings, early morphologists sought the laws that govern form and function. Similar
structures meant similar plans (Gestalt) or similar generational rules (Bildung), and the comparison
of anatomy and embryology were a means to discover them. Therefore, biological similarity was
explained by sameness of type, much like similar structures in minerals. In this typological context,
Richard Owen defined a “homolog” as “the same organ in different animals under every variety of
form and function” (Owen, 1843; Panchen, 1994).
Biology was radically transformed at the second half of the nineteenth century by the theory
of evolution (Ruse, 1999; Bowler, 2003). The large amount of data gathered from comparative
anatomy and embryology by earlier morphologists was one of the most important sets of evidence
presented by Darwin (1859) to support his theory, and it was subsequently re-interpreted in light of
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the new theoretical framework. The archetype of early
morphologists was replaced by the ancestor, and the concept of
homology was reappraised in genealogical terms (Haeckel, 1874).
As stated by Karl Gegenbaur, a leading morphologist converted
to evolutionism, “the theory allowed what previously had been
designated as Bauplan or Typus to appear as the sum of structural
elements of animal organization which are propagated by means
of inheritance” (cited in Coleman, 1976). The explanation for
sameness changed from shared organizational rules to shared
genealogy, and the “homolog” became defined as “the same trait
in different lineages due to common ancestry” (Lankester, 1870).
Although typological and genealogical concepts of homology
entailed different views of sameness, from a practical point of
view, both concepts involved the same operational criteria to
define it (Wagner, 1994; Bolker and Raff, 1996; Griffiths, 2007;
Hall, 2007). In both cases, homologies could only be inferred
by comparing features of the ontogeny and/or the structure of
the trait among organisms. However, comparisons of different
features, i.e., the use of different homology criteria, often conflict
with each other. The rise of experimental embryology at the
end of the nineteenth century, and the following advances in
cell biology and classical genetics, nourished the expectation
that the discovery of developmental mechanisms shared by
different lineages would yield an absolute biological criterion
for homology. Yet, the many advances in embryology and
genetics failed to achieve this. The lack of a unified criterion
has persisted obstinately since the origins of evolutionary biology
(Darwin, 1859, p. 532) and cell biology (Wilson, 1894), and was
thoroughly exposed byDe Beer (1971) in his classic paper entitled
“Homology: an unsolved problem”. The main conclusions drawn
by de Beer were:
(i) “. . . correspondence between homologous structures cannot be
pressed back to similarity of position of the cells of the embryo
or the parts of the egg out of which these structures are
ultimately differentiated.”
(ii) “. . . homologous structures can owe their origin and stimulus
to differentiate to different organizer-induction processes
without forfeiting their homology.”
(iii) “. . . characters controlled by identical genes are not necessarily
homologous.”
(iv) “. . . homologous structures need not be controlled by identical
genes, and homology of phenotypes does not imply similarity
of genotypes.”
The problem of which homology criteria to choose is perhaps
particularly complicated in the field of neuroscience. The
structural complexity of the nervous system and its interactions
with sensory and motor organs offer multiple possible criteria,
and in more than a few instances different criteria disagree
(Campbell and Hodos, 1970). This means that anatomical,
embryological, physiological, and behavioral features are
not always conserved together. For example, in different
animals, neurons can have similar connectivity (or hodology),
neurochemistry and function but display different morphologies
and ion channel densities (e.g., Purves and Lichtman, 1985;
Marder and Goaillard, 2006) or develop from different
embryonic precursors (e.g., Glover, 2001). In the same way,
similar behaviors can be conserved despite changes in the
underlying neural circuits (e.g., Newcomb et al., 2012).
Even though de Beer’s problem remains unsolved (see for
example Weiss and Fullerton, 2000; True and Haag, 2001;
Kawasaki et al., 2005; Schierenberg, 2005), there is currently an
assumption—implicit or explicit—that homology problems must
be addressed by developmental genetics. Many recent events,
such as the appearance of DNA sequencing tools, the concept of
regulatory genes in eukaryotes and the in situ analysis of genetic
expression, converged to renew the hopes of finding an absolute
criterion for homology. Indeed, comparative developmental
genetics has produced some of the most important achievements
in evolutionary biology in the last decades, resulting in profound
consequences to the concept of homology.
Saint-Hilaire’s Lobster and the
Dorsoventral Patterning Genes: The
Reductionist Appraisal of an Organismic
Statement
A good example reflecting the historical implications of
the developmental genetics approach is the 1990s revival
of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s hypothesis of the morphological
homology between the dorsal side of vertebrates and the ventral
side of arthropods. Around 30 years before Owen articulated
his definition of homology, the pre-evolutionary anatomist
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire was already seeking a formal criterion
for designating homologs (which he called “analogs”). In the
preliminary discourse of the first tome of his “Philosophie
Anatomique” he offers the following criterion: “The only
generality to be applied to the species is given by the position,
the relations and dependences between the parts, that is, by
what I embrace and designate as connections” (Saint-Hilaire,
1818). By proposing a unity of composition, or “unité de système
dans la composition et l’arrangement des parties organiques”
(“unity of system in the composition and arrangement of organic
parts”) for all animals, Saint Hilaire defied the ruling notion
of the time, put forward by his colleague Georges Cuvier.
According to Cuvier, every animal followed the body plan
of one of the four embranchements of the animal kingdom:
vertebrata, mollusca, articulata, and radiata (Cuvier et al., 1817).
With his loi des connections (law of connections), according
to which the connections held between homologous organs
in different animals remain constant, Saint-Hilaire established
various homologies between vertebrates and invertebrates, which
resulted in the indignation of Cuvier. One of his audacious
proposals was that the body plan of a lobster, an articulata,
was the same as that of a vertebrata, only with its dorsoventral
axis inverted (Saint-Hilaire, 1998 [1822]). This lead to a great
controversy that most historians agree was won by Cuvier.
Molecular embryologists reappraised Saint-Hilarie’s
hypothesis based on the inverted similarity of genes expressed
in the dorsal and ventral sides of the embryos of fruit flies and
frogs (Arendt and Nubler-Jung, 1994; de Robertis and Sasai,
1996). The finding of a conserved set of molecular interactions
led them to postulate the inversion of the dorsoventral axis
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during early chordates evolution and therefore to recognize
the homology between vertebrate and arthropod nervous and
digestive systems. The fact that Saint Hilaire’s hypothesis—
edified on the basis of comparative anatomy—only came to
be reconsidered after more than 150 years, following findings
in the field of molecular biology illustrates the impact of the
developmental/genetic criteria of homology in current biology.
The discovery of common DNA sequences and molecular
interactions across animal phyla revealed an unexpected new
level of conservation. A number of evolutionary developmental
biologists took these and other similar findings with caution and
postulated the term “deep homology” to refer to the conservation
of a “genetic regulatory apparatus” in morphologically disparate
traits among distantly related species (Shubin et al., 1997; Hall,
2003). However, many others took those cases as exemplars
for a new reductionist agenda: to elucidate the conservation
of molecular processes in early ontogeny in order to resolve
problematic homologies.
Nevertheless, considering the difficulties faced by
developmental criteria when determining homology, we
could pose two counterfactual questions: Could we confidently
ascertain that the neural system of arthropods and vertebrates
are non-homologs if they had different molecular mechanisms of
dorso-ventral axis specification? Certainly not, since variations
in developmental mechanisms at early ontogenetic stages occur
remarkably often. Inversely, could we confidently ascertain as
homologs any neural and digestive systems that are specified
by the same early developmental mechanism? Neither, since
common developmental mechanisms can generate different
structures.
A Competing Organismic-epigenetic View
of Homology
Why does developmental genetics face such hindrances when
attempting to provide an absolute criterion for homology?
We believe this to be the consequence of one of the most
prominent characteristics of living beings: they are dynamic
systems organized into multiple levels (Jacob, 1970; Mayr, 1982).
The hegemony usually granted to developmental and gene
expression-centered homology criteria results from ontological
assumptions that collapse the levels of organization and the
embryological history of organisms into their lower levels
and first stages of development. These assumptions are the
consequence of a reductionist and preformationist view of living
beings according to which development consists of the execution
of a genetically-coded building program. Organisms are regarded
in this framework as mosaics of ontogenetically independent
components whose structural properties are determined not
through their mutual interactions during development, but by
the accomplishment of their corresponding segment of the
genetic program (Carroll, 2005; Hoekstra and Coyne, 2007). If
this were the case, then the identity of a trait would be solely given
by gene expression patterns during its development.
If we assume that living beings are dynamically changing
systems that exist through continuous interactions between
their components in the epigenetic course of development,
then we cannot reduce the identity of all traits to a particular
ontogenetic stage, such as early development, or a particular level
of organization, such as the molecular level. The components of a
living system can (and constantly do) change without the identity
of the system nor the coherence with its environment being lost,
and these changes can occur at some levels of its organization
without producing changes in other levels, during both ontogeny
and phylogeny (Bertalanffy, 1962; Maturana and Varela, 1973;
Maturana and Mpodozis, 2000)1. It is the continuous historical
(moment to moment) realization of their organization—i.e., of
the relations held between their organic components at different
structural levels—what confers to organisms their identity at any
stage of ontogeny.
Three relevant consequences follow the adoption of this
organismic/epigenetic approach to living beings:
(i) Neither developmental nor genetic comparisons can supply
an absolute criterion for determining homology. Given the
systemic nature of living organisms and the epigenetic
nature of their development, the recurrence of traits
between generations does not imply the recurrence of
genetic nor developmental processes, because a given
ontogenetic state can be constituted by different sets
of components and attained by different developmental
trajectories.
(ii) When establishing a homology, both the level of
organization and the ontogenetic stage to be considered
must be in agreement with the delimitation of the compared
trait. Inasmuch as there is no privileged level or stage in the
realization of living organization, delimiting the object is
part of the establishment of a homology. The delimitation
of a trait is the distinction of a particular organization, a
particular set of relations held between components within
the organism, and therefore it is defined by the observer
and is not intrinsic to the composition of the living system
(Wimsatt, 1972; Striedter, 1999; Griesemer, 2000; Winther,
2006). In the same way, the establishment of a homology
is defined by the observer because it is the distinction of
the same set of relations within two individuals or lineages
(Maturana, 2002). The more reliable criteria to assess
a homology will be those aspects of the compared trait
that are most structurally restricted to change while the
organization that defines the trait is conserved.
(iii) The phylogenetic explanation is independent of the
establishment of a homology (Amundson and Lauder,
1994). Considering that inheritance is the repetition of a
process and not the transmission of a trait (Maturana and
Mpodozis, 2000; Oyama et al., 2001), whether a homologous
trait is present in the most recent common ancestor of the
compared species (what has been called a “true” homology)
1The evolution of actin filaments is a good example. The DNA sequences used
by the cell to the production of actin proteins in eukaryotes are so different from
the sequences used to produce MreB in bacteria that their homology had been
ignored until the tertiary structures of the proteins were revealed, showing that
lower levels of organization have changed while the structure necessary for the
process of dynamical polymerization has been conserved (Erickson, 2001; Colavin
et al., 2014).
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or is the result of parallel evolution (“latent” homology) is
relevant for its explanation, but irrelevant for its definition
(Arendt and Reznick, 2008). In both cases the homology
results from the recurrence of a historical, epigenetic
process2.
A Long-standing Homology Problem in the
Nervous System: The Case of the Amniote
Telencephalon
The pallium is the dorsal part of the vertebrate telenchephalon,
and in mammals its most prominent structure is the six-layered
isocortex. In diapsids (reptiles and birds), however, most of
the pallium is composed of the dorsal ventricular ridge (DVR),
which is organized into nuclei. Homologies between the pallia
of amniotes have been subject of much debate over the last
20 years. The controversy has been previously reviewed by
others (e.g., Reiner et al., 2005) and will be presented here
only briefly. The first tract-tracing studies that began to reveal
the organization of the sensory collothalamic projections (i.e.,
those sensory projections reaching the thalamus through a relay
in the midbrain) to the avian DVR led to the proposal of a
possible homology between nuclei in the avian anterior DVR and
specific layers inmammalian temporal isocortices (Karten, 1969).
Further studies continued to reinforce this notion by showing
striking similarities in the overall organization of sensorimotor
circuits; from the midbrain and thalamic structures (which
become homologized by extension, e.g., Major et al., 2000) to the
intra DVR circuits and the targets of their descending projections
(e.g., Wild et al., 1993; Wang et al., 2010; Ahumada et al., 2015).
Twenty-five years after it was first enunciated, this
“isocortex/DVR hypothesis” was challenged by the proposal of
the “claustroamygdala/DVR hypothesis.” First, based mostly
on work on the connections of the reptile forebrain, Bruce and
Neary (1995) put forward the hypothesis that the mammalian
homolog of the DVR was the basolateral amygdala (Figure 1).
Even though this hypothesis has received some further support
from hodological evidence (e.g., Novejarque et al., 2004; Guirado
et al., 2005), what truly fueled the debate was the later work
on homeobox gene expression patterns during development
(Reiner et al., 2005; Bruce, 2012). Different authors proposed
the amygdala and/or claustrum and endopiriform nucleus as
mammalian homologs to the DVR (Striedter, 1997; Fernández
et al., 1998; Puelles et al., 2000; Aboitiz et al., 2003). Thus, the
earlier isocortex vs. claustroamygdala controversy became a
debate between hodology and development/gene expression.
More recently, this debate has moved to a new phase, primarily
due to novel evidence showing that specific components
of the avian DVR express layer-specific isocortical markers
(Dugas-Ford et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Suzuki and Hirata,
2013) and that there is a common pattern of gene-expression
2De Beer (1971) and Hall (2007) have also proposed a congruency between
“true” and “latent” homologies, but their analyses differ to and have points of
disagreement with ours, as they appeal to the phylogenetic continuity of the
“developmental basis” (i.e., developmental genes) for parallel evolution to produce
“true” homologous structures.
FIGURE 1 | Competing hypotheses regarding the homologies between
mammalian and diapsid pallia. Schematic representation of coronal
sections of the brains of a mammal (A) and a bird (B, as example of a diapsid).
According to the claustroamygdala-DVR hypothesis (left side), the avian DVR
and hyperpallium are homologous to the mammalian claustroamygdalar
complex (blue), and neocortex (light red), respectively. According to the
isocortex-DVR hypothesis (right side), the avian DVR and hyperpallium are
both homologous to the mammalian isocortex (light red).
between the DVR and the hyperpallium (the widely-accepted
diapsid homolog to the striate cortex, see Figure 1B) during
development (Jarvis et al., 2013). These new data are seen as key
support to the isocortex hypothesis (Karten, 2013; Reiner, 2013),
and thus –much like the case of Saint Hilaire’s Lobster– the
focus of the debate has shifted to development/gene expression
grounds.
We consider the reduction of the problem to a case of
development/gene expression similarities to be intrinsically
misdirected. Whatever their embryonic or adult patterns of gene
expression, the hodological similarities of the diapsid DVR with
the mammalian isocortex and basolateral amygdala remain the
same. Homologies of gene-expression or cell types do not imply
homologies of the supra-cellular structures containing them, and
homologies of embryonic domains of gene expression certainly
do not imply homologies of the resulting adult structures. Levels
and stages of comparison should not be intermingled.
Accordingly, we think that the question about the identity of
the adult diapsid DVR can only be focused at the level where the
traits “neocortex” and “amygdala” are defined, which is the supra-
neuronal level. What defines the identity of a supraneuronal
structure is the set of relations it holds with the rest of the nervous
system, which in an adult nervous system conform sensorimotor
correlations of neural activity. The sensorimotor correlations that
define the neocortex and amygdala are attained by the functional
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interconnectivity between different neuronal groups and sensory
and motor organs, and not by properties intrinsic to any of them.
The aspects more restricted to change, and thus the most useful
as homology criteria, are those directly related to the connectivity
that maintain these sensorimotor correlations. These can include
neuronal morphology, neurochemistry, and most importantly,
hodology. Therefore, we consider that the way to settle the issue
of the diapsid DVR is to further unveil the organization of the
circuits it is involved in.
Conclusions
Most contemporaneous philosophers of science accepted the
assumption that scientific concepts should be dealt with in their
social and historical context (Dupré, 2012)3. To recognize that
scientific concepts are determined by the operations and practices
employed to define them, and not by the intrinsic properties
of the object, is an important premise in the present debate
about the definition of homology. To search for an absolute
or “biological” criterion of homology, able to explain sameness
across time and levels, is unfeasible and unnecessary. The sound
establishment of a homology means the sound comparison and
description of sameness in a scientific domain. Like a sound
experiment, it shall survive to different theories or explanations
(Griffiths, 2007). In other words, whatever our explanation for
3The epistemology of the concepts of gene and species illustrates well the power
of this new kind of philosophical analysis in biological sciences. Species and genes
mean different things for different sets of scientists and several philosophers of
biology tend to assume that they are defined and transformed by the practice
(Dupré, 2012; Godfrey-Smith, 2013; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013).
homology is, it will not deny the sameness in the connectivity
of the vertebrate visual system described by Cajal, the ontogeny
of the mandibular arches described by Meckel, or the synteny of
genes described by genomics studies.
The acknowledgement of the organismic-epigenetic nature of
living beings accounts for the incongruences in the search for
an absolute homology criterion and for the necessity to consider
the ontogenetic and organizational delimitation of the compared
trait when attempting to establish a homology. Homologies are
not to be determined according to the fulfillment of a unique
criterion, nor the largest amount of criteria, but of the most
appropriate criteria according to the level of analysis where the
identity of the trait is defined. From this organismic-epigenetic
perspective, the identity of the adult nervous system, when
considered from a high level of its organization, is defined by the
interactions that allow the coordination of the activity of different
neuronal populations and motor and sensory systems, i.e., its
functional connectivity. Focusing on the hodological criterion
rescues a key aspect of living beings: that they are processes.
As such, the identities of their components are given by their
interactions with the rest of the organism during the process of
life, or what Saint-Hilaire called connections.
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